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Condi and the peace process

October 16th, 2007 · 12 Comments

To mark Condi’s seventh trip to the region this year, I’m going to jot down some thoughts on the nascent peace process and the Annapolis confererence slated for late November or December. First, people still aren’t taking this very seriously by and large, despite Condi’s warnings to journalists on Monday. Palestinians, Israelis, journalists, etc, tend to think this is going nowhere. The Israeli right has been muted. Netanyahu has been largely silent. Hamas has issued a few blase statements about the conference but doesn’t seem too concerned. It will be interesting to see what comes of an ultra-orthodox protest slated for Thursday against dividing Jerusalem. It’s the first rumblings of popular dissent against Olmert’s peace efforts.

Those who think this isn’t a serious peace push are mistaken. If they go ahead with this peace conference in Annapolis, then there will be tremendous pressure for something substantive to come out of it. If it all comes to naught and if it turns out they were all just going through the motions, it will be terribly damaging to the Bush administration, and more importantly, to the regional credibility of Egypt and Saudi, if indeed the latter comes on board. More worryingly, a failed peace conference and another round of dashed hopes will further entrench feelings of utter hopelessness among Palestinians, which some fear could trigger another wave of violence.

One recurrent tune of conventional wisdom says that Olmert’s government will collapse at the mention of a divided Jerusalem since the ultra-orthodox Shas and the ultra-nationalist Yisrael Beiteinu are certain to jump ship. Shas leader Eli Yishai told Condi as much Monday. That is absolutely not the certainty that many are suggesting. The peace process, settlements, and relations with the Palestinians have never featured high on Shas’ priority lists. The party is sitting pretty right now with four cabinet posts. Yishai will certainly think twice before toppling a government and abandoning that influential perch. At Camp David in 2000, Yishai used support for Barak’s peace bid as a bargaining chip to try and gain control over religious schools (Dennis Ross, pg 601). If that precedent is any indication, Yishai’s current tough talk is just bluster aimed at extracting the biggest possible political concession out of Olmert when the time comes.

As for Avigdor Leiberman, the Yisrael Beiteinu chairman, he was languishing in political obscurity and irrelevance before he joined Olmert’s government. Now he’s Minister of Strategic Affairs and privy to the inner sanctum of government decision making. Furthermore, this is Leiberman’s opportunity to stake out a more moderate brand of politics that can make him a national politician with appeal beyond a narrow band of ultra-nationalists. He stands to lose a lot of political clout if this government falls.

So what to make of Olmert’s decision to appoint Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni to head the negotiating team? One, Olmert is trying to bring more people into the process to broaden his support and his chance of being able to make any agreement stick. The more cynical reading of Livni’s appointment is that Olmert has put Livni atop the negotiating team because he needs a fall guy/girl in case this whole affair collapses. Olmert has surely not forgotten that Livni lead a half-assed attempt to oust him from power last Spring.

Why aren’t Hamas and the Israeli right more concerned about the prospects of intolerable concessions by both sides? The short and simple answer is that it’s still early, and both Netanyahu and Hamas are likely calculating that this push will collapse without either one of them lifting a finger. If that happens, Hamas and Netanyahu both stand to benefit politically.

It’s also possible that this is all a cynical exercise by Olmert to placate the Bush administration until next summer, and that the right knows this and thus ain’t gettin’ it’s dander up for nothin’. Once the 2008 presidential campaign hits full stride in mid-summer, the Bush team’s engagement in the peace process is going to drop to near zero. The Republican nominee is going to want Bush out of the spotlight and will be scared to death of a last minute foreign policy disaster torpedoing his campaign. If Olmert is not nearly as enthusiastic about peace as some suggest he is, he just has to do the pro-peace song and dance to the US tune for the next six to eight months and then Israel will have the US out of its hair until well into the next administration.

Although Hamas may be isolated in Gaza and on the run in the West Bank, it can still play the spoiler if it chooses to, or at the very least demand that it be reckoned with. The Islamists have a powerful PR machine that can rally the Middle East masses against any deal between Abbas and Olmert. They can no doubt quickly organize massive protest rallies in the West Bank. A sustained rocket barrage on Sderot, meanwhile, would surely trip up any nascent peace process, especially if Israel responds with disproprtionate force as is likely.

Tags: Mahmoud Abbas · Ehud Olmert · Peace Process · Jerusalem · US Policy · Hamas · Palestinian · Israel

12 responses so far ↓

  • 1 Bart // Oct 16, 2007 at 9:14 pm

    Quote:
    A sustained rocket barrage on Sderot, meanwhile, would surely trip up any nascent peace process, especially if Israel responds with disproprtionate force as is likely.
    End quote.

    Just wondering, what would you consider a “proportionate” response? Israel firing qasames into Gaza?
    Seriously, this isn’t a flip question (well, maybe a little). What do you think is a proper military response to firing rockets at civilian targets?

    If you have an idea that would both halt the shooting and not cause any causalities in Gaza, I’m sure the IDF would be interesting in hearing about it.

  • 2 yaacov // Oct 16, 2007 at 9:29 pm

    Charles, you’re a well informed journalist, and you speak Arabic. Can you explain how your entire analysis concentrates on the Israelis? How about the Palestinians? Are they serious, or perhaps merely playing for time? If they’re serious, what are the various undercurents in their society? And so on and so on. All this concentration on the Israelis is flattering - or devious. It seems to me that you’re setting the stage - at least inadvertantly - to point at the Israelis once it doesn’t succeed. Not a word about Palestinian intractabilites, cynicisms, and so on, except a minor comment about Hamas.

  • 3 Andrew // Oct 16, 2007 at 9:35 pm

    I have always found the term Ultra-Orthodox offensive. Why can’t we simply be called Orthodox? Why are we Ultra? Or call us Haredi if you must. Or Frum. Or Torah observant.

    People who call us Ultra-Orthodox think of us as aliens, not people.

  • 4 Charles Levinson // Oct 16, 2007 at 9:56 pm

    Bart: your point is well taken. My phrasing was careless since the point of my post was not to wrestle with what is or isn’t appropriate use of force in response to rocket fire from Gaza.

    If there is a significant uptick in rocket fire from Gaza, I think there is a good chance Israel will go in hard, and that that will derail peace talks. Judging whether “going in hard” is proportionate or disproportionate was not really my intent.

    To answer your question, however, about what constitutes a proportionate response, I don’t have an answer. Obviously it’s a very difficult question that Israeli military and political leaders are wrestling with and they’re reaching different conclusions.

    Two things to consider. One, military force has not succeeded in stopping the rocket fire in the past. Two, as in any counterinsurgency, the consequences of using force, even if it succeeds in accomplishing short term tactical objectives (ie reducing rocket fire), can harm a mission’s longer term strategic and political goals (ie weakening Hamas, empowering Abbas, etc).

  • 5 Shual // Oct 16, 2007 at 10:00 pm

    Example

    Orthodox = Do not drive with cars on Sabbath […]

    Ultra-Orthodox = Thousands of ultra-orthodox Jews gathered on Bar-Ilan Street to protest driving on the Sabbath and even to throw stones at passing cars. One policeman was injured in the head and seven ultra-orthodox residents were arrested. In addition to throwing stones at cars being driven on the Sabbath, past violent acts committed by ultra-orthodox Jews in an effort to influence how secular Jews dress, eat and observe the Sabbath include slashing tires on the cars of women not dressed modestly, physically attacking women not dressed modestly, causing damage to restaurants and stores with non-kosher food and burning Israeli flags. [….] [I think, April 2007]

    Do you have any further questions, dear Andrew?

  • 6 Charles Levinson // Oct 16, 2007 at 10:04 pm

    Yaacov: No devious motives, I assure you. I’ll see about posting something more detailed on the Palestinian side shortly.

  • 7 Cranky Frankie // Oct 16, 2007 at 10:17 pm

    that’s funny Andrew… because i have always found the ultra-orthodox offensive.

  • 8 James Just // Oct 17, 2007 at 2:13 am

    Charles,

    America does not want Israel to lose, only the evil State Department bureaucrats do. Terrorists win if they do not lose and governments lose if they do not win. Therefore the Israeli government’s best option is always to remain on the offensive instead of reacting to events. The Peace Process is an obnoxious fiction. You have to remember that the first rule of counterinsurgency is to deny the enemy a safe haven from which to engage in offensive attacks, an option which always earns propaganda points in the MSM. To heck with low-level conflict, the only way Israel can hope survive into the future is to end these terrorist safe havens.

  • 9 Gabe // Oct 17, 2007 at 4:40 am

    Nice analysis. Here’s a different framework though: the Palestinian issue is minor compared to Iran. Conflict with Iran is the template that this should all be viewed upon. The IAF raid in Syria, an insignificant target which could have waited was meant to send a message to the Iranians. A deal with Hizbullah, a way to try and tear the three prongs of the new Persian empire apart. Annapolis is more about America and less about Israel. Olmert can simply not suffer an overt break with Bush if they are to do anything about Iran. It is also a fig leaf to the Saudis who are also quite scared of the Shia ascendancy

  • 10 Pappe // Oct 17, 2007 at 5:26 am

    Israel has simple red-lines:

    1. The Palestinian side should give up violence as a mean to a solution
    2. The Palestinian side must recognize the right of the Jewish people for a homeland in some borders in the area known today as Israel/Palestine. (despite any Koran interpretation that forbids the Jews from having sovereignty over any part of in Dar-a-Salam)
    3. The Palestinian side must give up the idea that it can over-take Israel demographically by demanding the Palestinian refugees will immigrate into Israel (instead of into Palestine)

    Abbas is unable to deliver any of those 3 key issues. He does not control the violence, he does not control the Hamas Islamists agenda and he is too weak to give up the so-called “right of return”(into Israel)

    Under these conditions it is not surprising that the conference have already been moved to December. Expect more date changes, maybe to January 15, 2032 ?

    Hopefully by that time Palestinian side will grow up and develop a set of realistic expectations. 30 years ago Israelis had unrealistic expectations – that have changed but it took time and blood.

  • 11 Nana Poku // Oct 17, 2007 at 11:04 am

    The sad thing is that there is only one possible deal that meets the minimum requirements of both sides and it’s already on the table.

    It involves two states, compensation (not right of return) for refugees, a divison of Jerusalem along the lines of Taba, and minor border modifications allowing some settlements to be incorporated in Israel in exchange for land elsewhere.

    Sadly, it may well take until 2032 until it sees the light of day.

    A parallel is what happened in Northern Ireland. The only possible solution there involved power sharing, devolved government and cross-border institutions. It was proposed and briefly introduced in 1974, only for a general strike to kill it.

    The agreement that the parties have finally signed up to is identical. It’s only taken 20-30 years, and more deaths, to get there.

  • 12 Shaking hands and stealing land « The Heathlander // Oct 19, 2007 at 10:54 am

    […] Charles Levinson, a British journalist and Middle East correspondent for the Sunday Telegraph, disagrees, arguing that “[t]hose who think this isn’t a serious peace push are mistaken”. He claims that, despite their threats, it is far from certain that Lieberman and Shas would actually withdraw from the ruling coalition in protest at Olmert’s negotiating positions with Abbas. The political prominence and influence conferred upon both parties by their involvement in the government, he maintains, could well be too important for them to follow through on their threats to walk away. His optimism places him in a distinct minority - both Palestinians and Israelis, including Israel’s military intelligence, view the Annapolis summit with extreme scepticism. “Since the goal of the conference amounts to a mere declaration of interests and doesn’t deal with the core issues,” explained Meretz head Zehava Gal-On, ”it will be pointless”. Indeed, the U.S. and Israeli governments have themselves been at pains to downplay any hopes for a “breakthrough” at the summit, the White House press correspondent explaining: […]

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